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Eoyality for Individuals 
or Eoyality for Groups 
Implications of the Supreme Court Decision in the Manhart Case 
William Van Alstyne 
A little more than two years ago, the AAUP entered an 
emerging dispute with TIAA-CREF, by far the largest 
insurance carrier in higher education. The question at 
issue was whether women who contribute the same 
amount as men should also receive the same monthly 
benefits as men who retire at the same age. The view 
which prevailed within the AAUP emphasized the fact 
that most women do not outlive most men; accordingly, 
it was deemed to be unfair to " penalize" all women 
because of a class characteristic which in fact would 
describe the status of but a minority of women. The 
view which did not prevail within the Association em- 
phasized that women as a group enjoy a significantly 
greater life expectancy than men as a group; accord- 
ingly, it was deemed to be unfair to return more bene- 
fits to women as a class than to men as a class, i.e., to 
"penalize" men in compelling them, in this sense, to 
"subsidize" women. 
Both sides to this controversy offered highly attrac- 
tive analogies for the good sense of their position. Few 
of those supporting equal monthly benefits for women 
were prepared to disallow age from being taken into 
account in determining the amount of payment to be 
made each month between two persons with identical 
aggregate contributions but retiring at different ages. 
On the other hand, few on the other side were prepared 
to allow race to be taken into account even in areas of 
insurance where the comparable cohorts of insured per- 
sons, grouped by race, exhibited significantly different 
life expectancies. Yet, in both these instances, similar 
observations for both sides of the argument could 
equivalently be offered. The disagreement as to which 
approach was more equitable with regard to sex was 
generally (although not uniformly) an honorable one, 
argued in good faith among bright people on both 
sides. After two years of consideration, however, within 
the AAUP itself the issue was resolved in favor of equal 
monthly benefits for equal contributions: women retir- 
ees, many of whom would live fewer months than most 
men, and most of whom would live no greater number 
of months than most men, were not to be personally 
disadvantaged despite the fact that women retirees as a 
total class exhibit a validated statistical characteristic 
(not subject to more individualized determination) of 
greater life expectancy. 
The disagreement within the Association regarding 
the proper policy nonetheless continued to be reflected 
in the disagreements of others: e.g., sociologists, econo- 
mists, actuaries, biologists, various groups of employees 
and employers, and the courts. From a legal per- 
spective, the debate was largely indistinguishable from 
earlier controversies involving the permissible or imper- 
missible use of race-related or sex-related differences of 
measurable statistical significance. The general dispute 
was of long-standing familiarity to students of equal 
protection theory: does the principle of equal pro- 
tection focus upon an entitlement to equal treatment as 
an individual, in disregard of a statistically significant 
difference that holds for a group with which the 
individual can be identified by an immutable character- 
istic but that is nonetheless not true of the majority of 
persons within that class? Or does the principle focus 
upon an entitlement to equal treatment fully cognizant 
of statistically significant personal characteristics em- 
ployed to provide parity between groups? 
In matters of race, it was already substantially well 
established as a legal matter that a person might not be 
individually disadvantaged even under circumstances 
where significant statistical differences were readily as- 
certainable between or among racial groupings. In mat- 
ters of sex, the social and legal tradition was undergoing 
change - but clearly moving in the same direction as 
the laws which already disallowed such disadvantaging 
distinctions to be drawn according to race even when 
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such distinctions were carefully related to aggregated, 
statistically accurate, statistically validated group dif- 
ferences. A review of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
particularly of Title VII, seemed to be professionally 
instructive. On the face of the statute, Congress ap- 
peared to have resolved this controversy, at least in the 
field of employment: certain categories (namely, race, 
religion, national origin and sex) were believed by Con- 
gress to operate with such overall unfairness to individ- 
uals grouped in such ways for differential treatment by 
employers, that such uses should be prohibited at least 
as a general proposition. To be sure, as in nearly all 
legal controversies Title VII was open to other possible 
interpretations, and, indeed, other interpretations were 
brought forward with considerable skill. 
On April 25, 1978, a significant part of the dis- 
agreement was terminated for most practical purposes 
by decision of the Supreme Court in City of Los Ange- 
les Department of Water and Power v. Manhart. What 
the Court held, and what it implied for universities as 
employers, should be of considerable interest. I shall 
treat the Manhart decision in two parts. First, a brief 
review of the case and of its holding. Second, some 
personal conjectures regarding the probable application 
of Title VII to universities as employers, with particular 
reference to their relationships with TIAA-CREF. 
A Summary and Explanation of Manhart 
The case arose under 42 U.S. Code §2000e-2(a) (1) 
which provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em- 
ployer ... to discriminate against any individual with re- 
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's ex. . . . 
The case itself was a class action brought in behalf of 
female employees of the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power. In respect to the compensation of 
such employees, each female received exactly equal 
monthly retirement payments from the Department's 
pension fund as males of the same age, seniority, and 
salary. Each female, however, was made to contribute 
slightly more each month than was required of each 
male. The larger monthly contribution required of each 
female employee was actuarially accurate inasmuch as 
the retired female employees as a class had a life expec- 
tancy longer than that of male employees retiring at the 
same age. As the monthly retirement benefit was paid 
to each employee until death, and as women retiring at 
the same age as men did, as a total class, "outlive" men, 
the difference in the larger sum each female was made 
to contribute into the pension fund was an accurate 
statistical reflection of the larger aggregate monthly 
benefits women retirees would receive as a class. Never- 
theless, the Supreme Court held the plan to violate 
Title VII. From the date of the decision (April 25, 
1978), unequal contributions may no longer be re- 
quired as a condition of eligibility for equal monthly 
benefit payments. 
The key to the decision is the following series of 
propositions by the Court: (a) the statute focuses upon 
protection of individuals; (b) it forbids disadvantage to 
the individual when resulting entirely from the individ- 
ual's sex (or race, religion, or national origin); (c) it 
disallows disadvantage to the individual even when 
based on a correct observation of difference about such 
persons who, when lumped in with others by sex (race, 
etc.) would as a class not be treated disadvantageously 
but exactly equally; and (d) it disallows such dis- 
advantaging of each individual of whom the class char- 
acteristic cannot be shown to be true even under cir- 
cumstances where it will not be possible to foretell 
whether the class characteristic will, or will not, be true 
of the individual. The essence of the case is contained 
in the following excerpt: 
"The statute makes it unlawful" to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation ... be- 
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na- 
tional origin. . . . The statute's focus on the individual is 
unambiguous. . . . Even a true generalization about the 
class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual 
to whom the generalization does not apply [Emphasis 
added]. 
It is true that insurance is concerned with events that are 
individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of 
many employment decisions. Individual risks, like individ- 
ual performance, may not be predicted by resort to classifi- 
cations proscribed by Title VII. [98 S. Ct. pp. 1340, 1775-76 
(1978)] 
The outcome of the case should not have been star- 
tling to anyone, in my opinion, except for the sheer 
ubiquitousness of actuarial habits persisting even after 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The majority 
of women in any given cohort do not in fact live longer 
than the majority of men of an equivalent cohort: i.e., 
the majority of a group of 1,000 women retiring at age 
sixty-five can be paired against the majority of a group 
of 1,000 men retiring at the same age, in terms of the 
age at which they die. From this perspective, the effect 
of the actuarial grouping by sex is to compel an intra- 
group subsidy among women: all women are compelled 
to contribute more to a retirement fund than any man is 
required to contribute because some women will live 
longer than most women and most men. (Alternatively, 
as in the TIAA-CREF situation, all women will receive 
less per month than any man will receive each month 
following retirement, because particular women will 
live longer than most other women and most men.) The 
disadvantaging of individuals because of their sex is 
forbidden by Title VII. Accordingly, the essence of the 
holding in Manhart is quite straightforward: a person 
may not be singled out by sex for the purpose of impos- 
ing a greater burden (higher contributions into a fund) 
or for the purpose of denying an equal benefit (lower 
monthly payments from the fund) because of a charac- 
teristic statistically identifiable to the group (greater life 
expectancy of women) but empirically false in respect 
to the majority of individual members within that 
group. 
Indeed, had the subject matter of the case been 
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anything other than insurance, it is implausible to sup- 
pose that the issue would have been felt worth con- 
testing. A single illustration may suffice. Suppose it to 
be true that in a given large employer's work force it 
happened to be the case that the turnover among fe- 
male or among black workers were 15 per cent higher 
than among male or among white workers. Suppose 
also that, from the employer* s point of view, this accu- 
rately translated into added business expenses for the 
employer exactly equal to five cents per hour "average" 
extra cost per female or per black worker. Though the 
"average" cost to the employer in respect to its female 
or black work- force cohort is thus five cents per hour 
per female or black employee more than the average 
cost per male or white employee, Title VII disallows the 
employer to offset that expense by paying each female 
or each black employee five cents per hour less than he 
pays each male or each white. What is a true observa- 
tion of each person viewed solely as a member of a 
statistically significant class will manifestly not be true 
of each member of that class when considered individ- 
ually. It will not even be true of a majority of the 
members of that class as individuals. At the same time, 
neither is there any feasible way for the employer to 
refine his extra costs per employee on an individual 
basis, i.e., at the time of hiring there is no efficient (and 
feasibly inexpensive) "test" pursuant to which he can 
accurately identify the individual female, black, male, 
or white workers whose personal early drop-out will 
account for the employer's added expense. The absence 
of any such feasible individualized "cost accounting" in 
no event, however, permits the employer to assign an 
average cost to each female or to each black employee 
as a substitute: a woman who individually cannot be 
shown to be a source of added expense (and a majority 
of whom will not in fact present such an added expense) 
may not be paid a lesser wage than a man doing the 
same work. Insofar as an employer would nonetheless 
attempt to burden each such person by paying five 
cents an hour less solely because of sex or race, it is a 
practice precisely forbidden to the employer by Title 
VII (and, in this illustration, by the Equal Pay Act as 
well). 
The Distinction between Employers and Insurance 
Companies 
I have been at some pains to reiterate the principle 
confirmed by Manhart in order that its general appli- 
cation might be clear. The particular holding of the 
Court was addressed, of course, only to the particular 
facts of the case: 
All that is at issue today is a requirement that men and 
women make unequal contributions to an employer-oper- 
ated pension fund. Nothing in our holding implies that it 
would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal 
retirement contributions for each employee and let each 
retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accu- 
mulated contributions could command in the open market. 
[98 S. Ct, p. 1380 (Emphasis added.)] 
In clarification of this observation, the Court noted in 
its footnote 33: 
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act govern relations between 
employees and their employer, not between employees and 
third parties. [Idem. (Emphasis added.)] 
The caveat was a sensible one. So far as Title VII is 
concerned, insurance companies are not subject to its 
prohibitions at all. So, too, with respect to the Equal 
Pay Act. Whether an insurance company might have to 
answer to certain policyholders under other statutes, 
whether they might be reached as an "agent" of an 
employer under Title VII (2000e[b]), or whether they 
may not have to answer at all, however, does not dis- 
place the full applicability of Title VII to employers. 
Where it is the employer's plan, whether that plan be 
mandatory or whether it be optional, Title VII will 
apply. The distinction may be shown in the following 
illustrations: 
Al. Oxbridge University has no on-campus parking 
facilities at all. To preserve its green spaces, moreover, 
Oxbridge is firmly resolved to maintain the status quo, 
i.e., in no way whatever does it intend to make any 
arrangements regarding parking. Unipark, Inc. is a 
wholly independent corporation which happens to op- 
erate the only commercial parking facility convenient 
to the Oxbridge campus. Unipark restricts access to 
men only. Question: Is Oxbridge liable under Title VII 
to its female employees? 
A2. Suppose exactly the same case as in Al, except 
that Unipark charges all women drivers fifty cents per 
day more to park than it charges men, based on its 
verified figures admittedly establishing that women 
parkers as a group cost it an average of fifty cents more 
per day to accommodate. Is Oxbridge liable to its fe- 
male employees under Title VII? 
Assuming you (correctly) answered both of the above 
questions "No," compare each of the following cases: 
Bl. Oxbridge withholds from each employee's pay 
five dollars per week pursuant to its "mandatory park- 
ing plan." Oxbridge matches each such mandatory em- 
ployee contribution with a like sum. The resulting sum 
is paid over to Unipark in exchange for which Unipark 
issues parking stickers to all Oxbridge employees who 
would otherwise be eligible to use Unipark's lot at its 
standard commercial rate. But as women drivers are not 
eligible to use Unipark's lot under any circumstances 
(see case Al above), Unipark issues no parking stickers 
to any of Oxbridge' s female employees. Is Oxbridge's 
liability to its female employees under Title VII contin- 
gent on Unipark's liability? 
B2. Same case as Bl, except that Unipark will extend 
equal parking privileges to any female employee hold- 
ing a Unipark sticker (issued pursuant to the Oxbridge 
mandatory parking-fee plan), upon additional payment 
by such employees of fifty cents at the parking entrance 
(as in case A2). Is Oxbridge liable to its female employ- 
ees under Title VII? 
B3. Because Unipark itself does not wish to collect 
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any money at its parking entrance but wishes, rather, 
simply to park only such cars as have Unipark stickers, 
Oxbridge itself collects fifty cents per week more from 
each female employee than from each male employee, 
paying the resulting aggregate amount to Unipark 
which then treats all employees identically. Is Oxbridge 
liable to its female employees under Title VII? 
B4. The Oxbridge plan in B3 is not mandatory, but 
entirely optional for each employee. It is, however, the 
only parking plan which Oxbridge provides. Is Ox- 
bridge liable to its female employees under Title VII? 
Case Bl is actually the bellwether case in this series, 
as in fact each succeeding case is but a less dramatic 
variation on Bl itself. One way of analyzing Bl is as 
follows. It is superficially logical. It is also wholly incor- 
rect. 
First as to Oxbridge. Oxbridge has paid each of its 
employees equal pay for equal work. Similarly, it has 
withheld the same amount from each employee and it 
has matched each such amount, all without any dis- 
tinction or differences linked with the sex of any em- 
ployee. Oxbridge has also negotiated the very best deal 
for its employees which it was able to secure. The policy 
pursuant to which female employees are barred is not a 
policy approved or promulgated by Oxbridge. It is a 
policy adopted, rather, solely by Unipark as a separate 
commercial concern, not answerable to Oxbridge's em- 
ployees because it is not their employer. We may even 
suppose that Oxbridge protested in a good faith effort to 
secure a change in Unipark's policy, at least insofar as it 
affected Oxbridge's employees, but that Unipark was 
obdurate. Oxbridge, having treated all of its employees 
alike, and itself not responsible for the policy of Uni- 
park over which it lacks control, is therefore not liable 
for Unipark's discriminatory exclusion of Oxbridge's 
female employees. 
Second, as to Unipark. In exchange for the univer- 
sity's payover of a weekly sum equal to ten dollars per 
employee, as an independent contractor Unipark 
agreed to do only what it said: to issue stickers to all of 
Oxbridge's employees otherwise eligible to park at its 
standard commercial rate. It has done all that it prom- 
ised to do and, accordingly, Unipark is not liable either 
to Oxbridge or to Oxbridge's female employees. 
Q.E.D.: neither Oxbridge nor Unipark is liable! Plau- 
sible as this analysis may seem, a moment's reflection 
(note what the women were compelled to contribute 
and yet what they received) should indicate how incor- 
rect it is. 
Rather, the proper way to analyze case Bl (and all 
the ensuing cases) is quite simple. It involves a single 
question: If the employer had himself furnished the 
service, would he have been in compliance with Title 
VII? If the answer is "yes," the employer is still in 
compliance though he furnishes the same service 
through a third party. If the answer is "no" the em- 
ployer remains liable though he furnished the same 
service through a third party. 
In case Bl, had Oxbridge acquired a parking lot of its 
own, deducted five dollars from each employee's pay, 
matched that sum with a like amount of its own to cover 
the costs of owning and operating that lot while ex- 
cluding all female employees from its use solely be- 
cause of their sex, liability under Title VII would be 
absolutely clear. Identically, Title VII will operate to 
forbid Oxbridge from dealing with an outside company 
whose policies would violate Title VII as applied to 
Oxbridge itself vis-^-vis its own employees. 
The Court's example in Manhart is not to the con- 
trary. In that example, the employer sets aside equal 
retirement contributions for each employee, regardless 
of sex. All employees are treated identically by the 
employer in respect to the trust fund thus accumulated 
by the employer: at the date of retirement, each em- 
ployee withdraws a like lump sum, enabling each to go 
out "in the open market" to purchase whatever some 
third party is willing to sell them by way of an annuity, 
at whatever price any third party may insist upon. That 
all such third parties might charge women more than 
men, or that some such third parties might altogether 
refuse to sell to women at any price, is regrettable but 
of no Title VII significance. It is of no greater signifi- 
cance than when the employer pays his male and fe- 
male employees equal take-home wages for equal work 
in a community in which all of the local merchants 
charge women a higher price for identical goods that 
the merchants sell for less to men. The employer has 
completely fulfilled its duty of strict nondiscrimination 
among its employees. Nothing more is demanded by 
Title VII. Title VII does not apply to merchants as 
vendors. 
Suppose, instead, that the employer wanted to pro- 
vide the same "retirement plan" as that described 
above, but with a single difference. Rather than accu- 
mulating the employee contributions in a trust account 
held and managed by the employer, it wished instead 
to utilize a bank for that purpose. Again, however, the 
bank will itself do exactly as the employer would itself 
have done had the employer kept hold of the trust 
fund: i.e., when each employee reaches retirement age, 
that employee will be paid by the bank the same lump 
sum he or she would have been authorized to withdraw 
had the employer maintained control of the funds in its 
"own" account. The plan thus furnished through the 
third party (the bank) is truly "the same" as that fur- 
nished by the employer directly. No Title VII violation 
is involved. The fact that identical lump sums available 
from the bank to women retirees may not be as useful to 
them as to men retirees (assuming all sellers of annuity 
plans in the open market persist in discriminating 
against women) changes nothing. 
To complete the picture, suppose instead that the 
employer's own plan requires equal contributions by 
male and by female employees but at retirement time 
pays out a smaller lump sum to females than to males. 
Without doubt, Title VII is violated. Just so if the 
"same plan" were furnished by the employer through a 
third party. Thus, if the employer collected equal con- 
tributions from male and from female employees, paid 
over the sums to a bank, and the bank paid out at 
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retirement larger lump sums to male than to female 
retirees, the employer remains fully liable under Title 
VII. What the employer cannot do directly, the em- 
ployer cannot do indirectly. If the employer cannot find 
a third party agreeable to the employer's own duty of 
nondiscrimination toward its employees, it has two 
choices under Title VII: provide the service itself (on 
nondiscriminatory terms) or abandon it altogether. 
What an employer may not do, however, is to provide it 
in any manner (including by arrangement with a third 
party) which discriminates among the employer's own 
employees by race, sex, religion, or national origin. 
To return one last time to our list of Oxbridge hypo- 
theticals, cases Al and A2, and cases Bl through B4, the 
answers are clear and consistent. In cases Al and A2, 
the employer provides no parking for anyone. It pays all 
employees the same for the same work, without any 
discrimination whatever. That its female employees 
may experience serious problems at the hands of Uni- 
park may well affect the morale of the Oxbridge female 
employees. It may also be unfair. It may even be sub- 
ject to redress under some other statutes. But it pro- 
vides no evidence that Oxbridge itself discriminates 
against its female employees. No more so than if Ox- 
bridge furnished no dining facilities - and the only 
commercial tearooms convenient to Oxbridge refused 
service to men (or charged men higher prices). 
In cases Bl through B4, however, Oxbridge is in 
violation of Title VII. Oxbridge as an employer could 
either furnish parking under its own auspices, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis consistent with Title VII, or it 
could deal with an outside parking company insofar as 
that outside company would treat Oxbridge employees 
as Oxbridge itself is under a Title VII duty to treat 
them. None of its plans conforms in either way, how- 
ever, and all are well calculated to result in successful 
actions being brought against Oxbridge. 
The AAUP, Universities as Employers, 
and TIAA-CREF 
If this analysis is sound, then it is easy to understand 
the problem which universities can readily anticipate if 
they continue to do business in the same way with 
TIAA-CREF and if TIAA-CREF (and other carriers 
who offer indistinguishable plans) does not at once 
modify its practice of paying less per month to each 
woman retiree than to each man retiree, though each 
has the same accumulation as of the same retirement 
date, under an employer-matching plan, whether man- 
datory or optional. It is quite clear that women employ- 
ees making contributions identical to those of their 
male counterparts after April 25, 1978 (the Manhart 
decision was not made retroactive) must thereafter re- 
ceive identical monthly payments insofar as they elect 
the single-life annunity benefit. Failure of the employer 
to bring this about will place the employer in violation 
of Title VII. 
It is less clear what alternatives are available to uni- 
versities. The alternative the AAUP has preferred con- 
templates a change in TIAA-CREF's own policy. That 
change would be to determine average life expectancy 
of teachers and professors eligible for TIAA-CREF, 
keyed of course to life expectancy of such persons at 
such age as they may elect to claim the benefit of a 
single-life annuity. In figuring that average life expec- 
tancy, TIAA-CREF may most certainly take into ac- 
count the proportion of men and women within the 
whole group. The individual premium charge for the 
same single-life annuity paying the same monthly ben- 
efit, however, would not itself be different for men than 
for women. In brief, a "merged table" prospect ively 
applied, is one answer. 
Alternatively, although the AAUP has not favored 
this solution, it is probably possible for universities as 
employers to maintain the current arrangement with 
TIAA-CREF with no change in TIAA-CREF policies, 
but with the universities as employers contributing ad- 
ditional sums by way of "topping up" payments in 
behalf of their women employees. Tested by the model 
I have suggested earlier, I believe this would be a 
legally permissible answer. For if a university were 
literally a self-insurer, insofar as women were made to 
contribute no more than men for a single-life annuity 
paying equal monthly benefits from the date of retire- 
ment, presumably the manner in which the university 
internally accounts to itself to produce this result is 
without legal interest. 
Some members of the AAUP, however, have ex- 
pressed two reservations with this approach. First, it 
may be a poor policy in the sense that it is calculated to 
perpetuate divisiveness among male and female em- 
ployees (the former being more inclined under this 
approach to regard the latter as being "subsidized" at 
"their" expense; the latter being more inclined to see in 
the university's policy a sentiment that "women cost 
more" as employees, a policy stigmatizing them and 
suggesting an incentive for employers to discriminate 
against them in hiring). As a policy, it has the same 
unwelcome flavor as would be true if black academics 
had shorter life expectancies than white academics 
within the same university - and the policy of the uni- 
versity were to charge equal premiums for a life insur- 
ance benefit, "topping up" the premiums of blacks. 
Second, it is not entirely free of legal questions. In 
relation to TIAA-CREF, insofar as TIAA-CREF would 
continue to do business as usual but the university 
would act to insure monthly benefits to women by 
"topping up" the university's contribution on their be- 
half, the situation is just the same as in one of our 
parking hypotheticals. In the case (B2) in which Uni- 
park would permit women to park if, but only if, they 
paid fifty cents more per day than each man (and also 
held a parking sticker furnished through the univer- 
sity's mandatory parking plan pursuant to which the 
university charges women the same as men for the 
stickers), Oxbridge might have attempted to rescue its 
plan by "topping up" its own payment to Unipark in 
behalf of women. That is, Oxbridge would "bribe" 
Unipark by paying Unipark fifty cents per day extra for 
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each woman employee eligible to park there, thus ful- 
filling its obligation that the same parking privilege is 
available to women and to men all of whom had the 
same amount withheld from their pay. 
The possible legal objection is that, from one point of 
view, while Title VII may be satisfied under such an 
arrangement (in that male and female employees enjoy 
identical, employer-furnished parking privileges for 
identical contributions), a separate federal statute, the 
Equal Pay Act, may now be violated. If one focuses 
narrowly on the sums of money the employer pays out 
in consideration of each woman employee performing 
the same work as a male counterpart, plainly it is a 
larger sum. Viewed this way, men may complain that 
they do not receive "equal pay" for "equal work." 
Even so, the analysis is misplaced and almost certain 
to fail. The proper test under the Equal Pay Act is not 
cost to the employer, but benefit to the employee. 
Women employees have no option to receive extra dol- 
lars for the same work; rather, they are entitled to 
receive only the same benefit as men doing equal work. 
That furnishing the same benefit to its women employ- 
ees as to its men employees may cost the employer 
more (because of third-party commercial practices 
themselves not reachable either under Title VII or un- 
der the Equal Pay Act) is of no consequence. It is not 
different from the employer's distributing free groceries 
on equal terms to all employees, after purchasing them 
from an idiosyncratic wholesaler who charged the em- 
ployer a price partly dependent upon the proportion of 
men and women employed by that particular employer. 
Whatever the grievance of employees against the gro- 
cer (and they will need some statutory or constitutional 
basis to do anything about it), they plainly have none 
against the employer. 
Thus, though it may not be the desirable long-term 
solution (assuming that TIAA-CREF declines to alter 
its practice), universities may presumably come into 
conformity with the implications of Manhart by an 
internal policy, prospective in character, of "topping 
up" its contributions to assure women employees who 
make equal contributions an entitlement to equal 
monthly annuity benefits upon retirement. 
The fact that this alternative is immediately available 
to universities as employers, moreover, may also weigh 
heavily against any insitution which is dilatory in mak- 
ing a change in its policy. Quite understandably, a 
number of institutions may momentarily believe that 
they are caught in a legal quandary. If TIAA-CREF 
itself cannot be made legally answerable (an issue 
which remains to be decided in the courts) and if it is 
not practical to shift to another insurance carrier offer- 
ing otherwise comparable plans utilizing merged mor- 
tality tables, a university might very well conclude that 
it has an adequate reason at law to defer any change 
pending further legal developments. But insofar as the 
"topping up" alternative is at once both legal and 
available (and budget stringency from complying will 
itself clearly not excuse a continuing violation of Title 
VII), it is very unlikely that any such defense will be 
accepted by the courts. 
Conclusion 
This article, like Manhart itself, has been unavoid- 
ably narrow. The reader may be rightly impatient 
with the legalisms, the proliferation of hypothetical, 
the excessive preoccupation with so slender a subject as 
"single-life annuities." In drawing back from the sub- 
ject, however, a second, wider view of the Manhart case 
may enlist the interest of the profession in much larger 
issues. The tension in the Manhart case, it will be 
recalled, was basically the tension between justice to 
individuals considered personally, and justice to indi- 
viduals considered as members of validly significant 
groups. It is, in its way, a companion case to Bakke v. 
The Regents of California. It may be worth pausing 
over, to think through its comparisons with that pre- 
occupying problem. 
A response to this article by TIAA-CREF will be pub- 
lished in the next issue of the Bulletin. 
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